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Party To Nauru Agreement

By on December 14, 2020 in Uncategorized

Bluefin tuna fishing in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is of concern about the growing impact on yellow fins and bycatges of aspirated tuna. In order to address sustainability issues, the parties to the Nauru Agreement (NAP) adopted the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing within the WCPO. The VDS has the potential to enhance the economic benefits for ANP members and contribute to the sustainability of tuna stocks and has become, since 2012, an important mechanism for regulating access rights for fishing in ANP waters. Nevertheless, monitoring and implementation remain weak, leading to violations of the agreement. Based on a theoretical framework of the game, this paper examines the effectiveness of the VDS and its impact on the regionalism of the fishery. We review payments made by nauru member countries in full compliance and payments in partial compliance currently observed. Our results indicate that partial compliance with the VDS rules by Member States plays a role in stabilizing the agreement. On the other hand, full compliance with the rules can provide a strong incentive for ANP members to deviate from the VDS, as third parties offer attractive advantages in exchange for privileged access to fishing areas. However, pragmatic tolerance of derogations from full compliance with the VDS appears to play a supporting role in promoting fisheries cooperation and regionalism. Our analysis makes two important contributions to the review of international fisheries agreements. First, pragmatic tolerance of small gaps and hence short-term partial compliance can be an important step towards full cooperation. In light of this finding and as has happened in the discussions on flat agreements, full participation in international agreements on common resources can be improved if flexibility is allowed. Second, countries that benefit more from transfers than the value of lost resources are encouraged to support pragmatic tolerance, while members with fewer transfers are not encouraged to give their fishing days for free or cheap.

Once transfers are cancelled, countries are likely to push for comprehensive VDS compliance rules to maximize the potential benefits of full cooperation. At last week`s meeting of ANP ministers in Palau, the Tokel and the parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allowing the South Pacific territory to accede to the FSM agreement (FSMA), an agreement that allows the agreed parties under the agreement to access other fisheries resources. The results also underline the importance of third-party transfers on the economic benefits of countries. In summary, our results, without third-party transfers, show that distributions from participation are better if full compliance is respected – which corresponds to the theoretically ideal situation and the future objective. The role of these transfers in non-compliance with the VDS raises broader questions about the political economy of fisheries agreements and their impact on the success of fisheries regionalism. In our case, we find that offences and pragmatic tolerance of partial compliance with the VDS are strongly influenced by agreements with (and in favour) of remote fishing nations. Therefore, the design and implementation of the VDS cannot be isolated from the dynamics and complexity of the underlying political pressure of the DWFNs that maintain and maintain access to tuna resources (e.g. B Havice 2010; Parris 2010; Campling and Havice 2012).

Understanding this political dynamic helps us to better understand the internal dynamics of tolerance in order to ensure the continued stability of an international agreement (Finus and Maus 2008; Wangler et al. 2013). As this study shows, the current level of compensation for tolerance for partial compliance may not be sustainable in the long term, as tolerance can now have negative effects on future stocks and, therefore, threaten sustainable tuna catches.

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